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Climate servicesThe growing attention user relevance is receiving in the context of climate services is giving new light to
engagement activities. However, while there is an almost unanimous consensus that these are important
to the delivery of usable services, there is relatively little quantitative evidence of their impact on the use-
fulness of the service or its value as perceived by the users and decision-makers. Using a simple Bayesian
decision theoretic framework, we have analysed how the perceived value of the service changes as a
function of the user’s belief in the accuracy of the forecast. Based on this, we conclude, that, at least
for the generic users adopted for our analysis, 30 or more repeated forecasts may be needed to ascertain
the real user value of a predictive service. However, we argue that engagement between users and service
providers can play a significant role in modifying the perceived accuracy and value of the service, bring-
ing it closer in line with the objective evaluation. This requires feedback from users on both the specific
climate information content and its presentation, alongside exploring the user’s attitude to risk. If appro-
priate engagement can be achieved, this work suggests that it has the potential to alter the overall per-
ceived cost-benefit ratio over a relatively short period of time, enabling users to make best use of the
available climate information.
 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Practical Implications
The appropriate use of skilful seasonal forecasts has the potential to improve decision making across a range of sectors, and pro-
mote a proactive approach to climate adaptation, thereby providing significant societal benefits. We have here analysed how the
value of a climate service changes as a function of the user’s belief in the accuracy of the forecast information. Here, users are
defined to be a person or organisation which makes decisions based on the forecast information, subject to specified costs and
losses, and who are influenced by the environment in which they operate, their prior beliefs and risk appetite. To study the behaviour
of these theoretical users, we consider the following generic types: 1) users who initially believe the stated accuracy of the forecast,
but with differing levels of scepticism; 2) users who do not initially believe the stated accuracy of the forecast, and also have differing
levels of scepticism. Both types of user adjust their beliefs over time in response to the forecast performance. Our results indicate
that users who are initially more sceptical of the forecast performance are correspondingly more likely to perceive its value to be
lower for longer. A consequence is that such users may be more likely to discontinue using the service, which will be disadvanta-
geous for them in the long term. For the simple, albeit realistic, cost/loss matrix used in this analysis, we also have shown that it
can take at least 30 repeated forecasts for the perceived value (i.e. the value based on a user’s subjective experience of forecast per-
formance) to converge to the objectively-defined expectation value. These results highlight the importance of suitable engagement
activities, which clearly and honestly demonstrate the accuracy of the climate information in a form appropriate to the user, as well
as exploring users’ attitude to risk. Doing so has the potential to shorten the time taken to adopt the service, thereby enabling users
to make best use of the available climate information for making decisions.tion: A
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The recent international focus on climate services (e.g. Hewitt
et al., 2012) has put users and their perceptions at the centre of ser-
vice development. However, although a strong agreement exists on
the need for closer engagement between providers and users of cli-
mate information (e.g. Goddard et al. 2010; Economou et al. 2016;
van der Voorn et al. 2017), very few attempts have been made to
quantify the value of such activities. Furthermore, the few studies
that do exist have focused more on the importance of community
engagement for climate change adaptation than on decisions
which are relevant over a climate prediction time-scale (e.g. sea-
sonal forecasting). Here, we demonstrate a flexible approach with
which to assess the objective economic value the engagement
process could have for users, through the adoption of a simple
Bayesian modelling framework.
It has been shown (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1997; Richardson,
2000; Thornes and Stephenson, 2001; Mason, 2004) that the value
of forecasts depends on the specific decision portfolio and associ-
ated payoffs, the risk appetite and the regulatory framework in
which users operate. More succinctly, the forecast value is depen-
dent on a user’s (interpretation of the) costs and losses in response
to different combinations of decisions and physical outcomes. At
the same time, it is reasonable to expect (e.g. Kirchhoff, 2013,
and references therein), that a few incorrect forecasts at the begin-
ning of a trial can disproportionately affect the uptake of a service,
although some evidence may suggest otherwise (e.g. Lemos et al.
2014). In other words, the strength of user belief in the forecasts
is an additional factor that will affect the perceived forecast value
to any user.
The question we are trying to answer here is whether, and if so
by how much, early engagement with the user can alter the uptake
of the service by affecting the a priori expectation of the service
value. For the purposes of this investigation, the users under con-
sideration are assumed to be individuals or organisations which
make decisions that are informed by climate services. For this rea-
son, the terms ‘‘user” and ‘‘decision-maker” are used interchange-
ably throughout this work. As outlined below, the salient
characteristics of these theoretical users are defined by their
cost/loss function and interpretation of forecast accuracy. By
applying this framework to a sequence of forecasts, we can quan-
tify the theoretical user’s subjective perception of forecast value.
In application to real users, these characteristics will be influenced
by the environment in which they operate, their risk appetite and
prior beliefs.2. Value of information
Although many users are keen to use the best and most accu-
rate data available, experience suggests that the minimum level
of forecast accuracy required to inform a specific decision depends
significantly on the context of that decision. In addition, optimal
decision-making, based on forecasts, requires a clear understand-
ing of both the costs and losses associated with different outcomes
and decisions, as well as the accuracy of the forecast. It is unlikely
that users will ever share this highly sensitive information with cli-
mate service developers; however, in some cases, it is possible to
infer the relative ratios of costs and losses, based on users’ deci-
sions. This is particularly evident in a climate service prototype
developed for the UK transport sector, as part of the FP7 EUPORIAS
project (Hewitt et al., 2012; Palin et al., 2016; see also Bruno Soares
and Dessai, 2015). During early engagement with stakeholders
from across the transport sector, it became clear that there was
interest in the provision of winter impact forecasts. However, these
potential users were not, in general, prepared to make explicit usePlease cite this article in press as: Pope, E.C.D., et al. Quantifying how user-int
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cism about forecast accuracy, and partly because the penalty
(due to regulatory instruments and risk appetite) of failing to ade-
quately prepare for one significant icy/snowy event would have
been much greater than the potential savings achieved through
preparing for a warmer than average winter.
These observations are broadly consistent with previous work
(e.g. Richardson, 2000, 2012) which demonstrates that, given a cer-
tain level of skill (however defined), the only users who could ben-
efit from a prediction are those for whom the cost of undertaking a
mitigation action is in some sense close in magnitude to the poten-
tial loss. Accordingly, it follows that trivial options, such as either
taking action at all times, or never, can easily become the optimal
strategy for those users characterised by a highly skewed cost-loss
function.
However, even if we limit ourselves here to those users whose
cost/loss function means they can gain value from climate forecast
information, the real value they can achieve is less than this theo-
retical maximum, even when accounting for limitations in the pre-
dictive ability of the forecasting system. This is because of
subjectivities in the way in which users interpret the climate infor-
mation; for example, their personal interpretation of the informa-
tion, based on their innate scepticism and prior experiences, as
well as a potential reluctance to fully adopt new practices.
Assuming the behaviour of a decision-maker can be modelled
through a Bayesian (probabilistic) framework, we show here that
the subjective value of the climate/weather prediction (a priori
belief) can have a measurable impact on its real (e.g. monetary)
value. We demonstrate this behaviour using two paradigmatic
examples: 1) users who initially believe the stated accuracy of
the forecast, but with differing levels of scepticism; 2) users who
do not initially believe the stated accuracy of the forecast, but
who also display differing levels of scepticism. We then study
the evolution of the subjective value over time and its reaction to
the occurrence of positive (successful predictions) and negative
(wrong predictions) experiences.
We conclude that, while the long-term perception of the fore-
cast value must correspond to its real value irrespective of the ini-
tial a priori belief, the transient perception can be quite different
between the two cases. This means that service providers that
are genuine about their evaluation of the forecast accuracy, should
put as much care as they can into the user engagement as this can
significantly affect the transient value of the predictions.3. Methods
The Bayesian framework, mentioned above, is used to describe
key influences on users’ decisions-making, and consists of two
main parts: firstly, a decision theoretic framework which captures
user decision-making based on a cost-loss (utility) matrix that
quantifies consequences for each decision-outcome combination;
secondly, the Bayesian probabilistic framework, which describes
the user’s belief or perception of the forecast accuracy given its
running performance. These are discussed in more detail below.3.1. A decision theoretic framework for user action
For simplicity, a 2-by-2 cost/loss matrix is considered (Katz and
Murphy, 1997; Mylne, 2002; Richardson, 2012). In this approach
there are only two outcomes: a specific uncertain (weather) event
(denoted as h1) will occur with probability Pðh1Þ or it will not occur
(denoted as h2) with probability Pðh2Þ ¼ 1 Pðh1Þ. Similarly, there
are only two decisions: to either take action before the event
(D = 1) at some cost, or not (D = 2) with associated losses if the
event occurs. Table 1 shows the associated cost/loss matrix whereeraction can modify the perception of the value of climate information: A
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Table 2
Contingency table of historical occurrences of the event hj and associated forecasts Xj .
The total number of events is
P2
j¼1
P2
k¼1Nj;k ¼ N.
h1 (e.g. icing occurring) h2 (e.g. icing not occurring)
X1 (icing forecast) N1;1 (hit) N1;2 (false alarm)
X2 (icing not forecast) N2;1 (miss) N2;2 (correct rejection)
Table 1
Generic cost/loss matrix.
h1 (e.g. icing
occurring)
h2 (e.g. icing not
occurring)
D = 1 E.g. taking
de-icing action
U11 (correct action) U12 (incorrect action)
D = 2 E.g. taking no action U21(incorrect inaction) U22 (correct inaction)
E.C.D. Pope et al. / Climate Services xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 3UD,j quantify the costs or losses for each decision D = 1, 2 and out-
come hj (j = 1, 2). Note that a similar matrix is used to quantify the
performance of the forecast in terms of numbers of hits, misses,
false alarms and correct rejections.
It is important to note here that, in the most general case, the
penalties are a subjective combination of the true economic costs
of the decision/outcome, as well as the user’s own attitude to risk.
For example, a more risk averse user will tend to assume a higher
penalty for forecast misses or false alarms, than a user with prefer-
ences for lower risk aversion. In either case, the methodology
outlined below applies, while noting that the costs and losses for
a given set of outcomes and decisions are themselves subjective.
From the user-defined cost-loss matrix and the associated
probability of the event, the expected value of a forecast for each
decision D is
P2
j¼1UDjPðhjÞ (note this is in the same units as the
costs/losses). The Bayes rule (Lindley, 1985) implies that the
rational decision to take is the one that minimises value, as shown
in Eq. (1).
Note that ‘‘value” here is defined as an outgoing expense, e.g.
monetary costs and losses, hence the minimisation. This, however,
is not a restriction, and the UDj values can be in units of utility, e.g.
by expressing the best and worst possible outcomes UDj as 1 and 0
respectively, and then choosing the other UDj relative to those. In
that case the optimal decision is one which maximises expected
utility. See Lindley (1985) for details on how to obtain the UDj in
this manner.
In the absence of any forecast information, we use Pðh1Þ as the
climatological frequency from historical occurrences, giving the
Expected Value of Climatological Information (EVCI):
EVCI ¼ minD
X2
j¼1
UDjPðhjÞ: ð1Þ
Eq. (1) suggests that, for fixed costs and losses, the optimal deci-
sion depends on the cost-loss ratio, as well as Pðh1Þ. Notably, users
with very high losses compared to costs, will require very high
forecast accuracy before they decide not to take action. This goes
some way to explaining some users’ reluctance to make use of sea-
sonal forecasts.
In contrast, if we knew beforehand what outcome would obtain,
we would always be able to identify the decision which minimises
losses (i.e. we know whether h1 or h2 will occur each time, so the
decision is a simple choice of the lowest number in each column
of Table 1). This situation describes a forecast which provides
‘‘perfect information”, and defines the theoretical lower limit of
losses in the long-run. The expected value is obtained by multiply-
ing the minimum loss by the corresponding frequency event and
summing all the products obtained for the different events. The
Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) is then given by the
difference between ECVI and the expected value of the optimal
decisions based on perfect forecast information
EVPI ¼ EVCI 
X2
j¼1
minDUDjPðhjÞ: ð2Þ
So, if a user is interested in investing in forecast information,
other than climatological frequencies, it is not worth them spend-
ing more than the value of the EVPI.Please cite this article in press as: Pope, E.C.D., et al. Quantifying how user-int
Bayesian approach. clim. Ser. (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cliser.2017.06We now consider forecast information which is not perfect and,
therefore, provides only ‘‘partial information”. The value of this
partial information will, of course, be determined primarily by
the forecast accuracy.
To illustrate this, we consider a deterministic, binary forecast
(e.g. representing an ensemble mean). Let X1 denote a forecast of
the event h1 occurring, with X2 denoting a forecast of the event
not occurring (i.e. h2). The ‘‘forecast accuracy” can then be defined
by the conditional probabilities PðhjjXjÞ. One simple way of quanti-
fying this conditional probability is to calculate the frequencies
from a 2-by-2 contingency table of historical data (see Table 2).
For instance, Pðh1jX1Þ could be derived from the quantity N1;1=N, as
Pðh1jX1Þ ¼ Pðh1&X1Þ=PðX1Þ ¼ ðN1;1=NÞX2
j¼1Nj;1
 .
N
  : ð3Þ
In this context, Pðh1Þ represents the ‘‘base rate” probability
ðP2k¼1N1;kÞ=N) and the Expected Value of Partial Information
(EVPaI) is given by:
EVPaI ¼ ECVI 
X2
k¼1
PðXkÞminD
X2
j¼1
UDjPðhjjXkÞ: ð4Þ
where the first term is the expected loss of just using the climatol-
ogy for PðhjÞ: The second term is the expected loss from using fore-
cast information: the innermost sum reflects the fact that the
decision to take action is made based on PðhjjXkÞ, and the outermost
sum is the expectation over the possible values that the forecast Xk
might take. Following Richardson (2000), we present the value of
the forecast in relative units; according to the definitions given
above this corresponds to EVPaI/EVPI.
Given the example of a deterministic, binary forecast, each indi-
vidual forecast must be either correct (i.e. hit or correct rejection
with corresponding probabilities: Pðh1jX1Þ and Pðh2jX2Þ respec-
tively), or incorrect (i.e. false alarm or miss with respective
probabilities: Pðh2jX1Þ ¼ 1 Pðh1jX1Þ and Pðh1jX2Þ ¼ 1 Pðh2jX2Þ).
For clarity of exposition, we assume Pðh1jX1Þ ¼ Pðh2jX2Þ, and call
this probability the ‘‘forecast accuracy”. We also assume
PðXkÞ ¼ PðhkÞ, i.e. that the frequency bias is unity. The extension
to the case where these conditions are no longer valid (i.e.
PðXkÞ–PðhkÞ and Pðh1jX1Þ–Pðh2jX2Þ), would require three probabil-
ities to be specified, rather than one. This would involve a non-
trivial extension of our framework and is left for future work as
it is outside the scope of this paper.
For a given loss matrix (U11 = U12 = 5, U21 = 30, U22 = 0) with
Pðh1Þ ¼ 1=3, we can compute Equation (4) for a range of forecast
accuracies, shown in Fig. 1 (see also Benton et al., 2017 for another
application). For this particular cost/loss table, forecast accuracy
needs to exceed 0.75 before the forecast becomes of appreciable
value to a user over the long term.
As highlighted above, it is important to note that EVPI and EVPaI
are expectations. As such, over a long time-scale, the value of a
forecast will asymptotically tend towards this limit. However, over
short timescales, the forecast value can differ significantly, as
determined by the performance of the forecast event by event.
Below, we explore this effect using stochastic simulations. For
example, assuming that the forecast is typically correct 4 times
out of 5, means that the accuracy is Pðh1jX1Þ ¼ Pðh2jX2Þ ¼ 0:8. Fromeraction can modify the perception of the value of climate information: A
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Fig. 1. Comparison of relative value for perfect and partial information assuming
U11 = U12 = 5, U21 = 30, U22 = 0 and P(h1) = 1/3.
4 E.C.D. Pope et al. / Climate Services xxx (2017) xxx–xxxthis, an artificial sequence of forecast successes and failures can
then be simulated using a Bernoulli distribution with probability
of success 0.8.
3.2. Subjective assessment of forecast accuracy
The analysis above is based on an objective calculation of the
forecast accuracy, as defined here, but applies equally well for a
subjective analysis as a way of estimating user perceptions of the
value of climate information. In this case, we can gain an important
understanding of the motivations behind characteristically differ-
ent types of user behaviour. For example, why do some users con-
tinue to use forecasts while others do not? One qualitative scenario
is that an individual user may perceive a forecast to be less accu-
rate than prescribed, because of short-term poor performance.
Accordingly, they are also likely to consider its value to be lower
and, therefore, may stop using the forecast. At the other extreme,
users whose personal experience suggests that the forecast is more
accurate than specified, might become overconfident in the fore-
cast and fail to build contingency into their plans. In both cases,
it is important to note that the ‘‘true”, long-run accuracy of the
forecast has not changed, only the perceived or short-term accu-
racy. Both examples suggest a strong influence of subjective
assessment of forecast accuracy combined with intuition about
the value obtained from the forecast. In short, a more accurate
forecast is perceived as more valuable, while a less accurate fore-
cast is perceived as less valuable.
The arguments outlined above suggest that a user may stop
using the forecast if their subjective estimate of its accuracy
implies that its expected value falls below the threshold described
earlier (see Fig. 1). It is, therefore, important to understand the
user’s beliefs and perceptions of forecast accuracy. The need to
explore this in a quantitative way motivates the Bayesian statisti-
cal model, outlined below, which provides a way of describing user
response to a deterministic, binary forecast. In the interests of
maintaining clarity, we have not considered forecast uncertainty
beyond the knowledge that the forecast is imperfect, but provide
a discussion in the ‘‘Probabilistic forecasts and uncertainty”
section.
Suppose the binary sequence of successes and failures is:
YðtÞ ¼ 1 if forecast is correct
YðtÞ ¼ 0 if forecast is incorrect
where t is time. Then YðtÞ is a sequence of Bernoulli trials where
PðYðtÞ ¼ 1Þ ¼ p is the forecast accuracy defined earlier (i.e.
p ¼ Pðh1jX1Þ ¼ Pðh2jX2Þ). We can then generate different realisa-Please cite this article in press as: Pope, E.C.D., et al. Quantifying how user-int
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retical user to the forecast performance described by each
sequence. If p ¼ 0:8, in the long-run 80% of the forecasts should
be successful (and 20% should be incorrect). However, due to the
random nature of the sequences, there will be realisations for which
the local value (in time) of the accuracy will be lower or higher than
the specified long-term value. The idea behind this approach is that
the user updates their belief in the accuracy of the forecast based on
its performance, forecast by forecast. It is, therefore, important to
consider users’ beliefs in the two main pieces of information
supplied by the forecast provider:
1) the forecast
2) the forecast accuracy p
If the information provided about forecast accuracy is
convincing, users may be more likely to continue using the forecast
even if it is incorrect a few times. Therefore, by providing more
information about the accuracy of the forecast, we can go some
way to ensuring that users are able to extract more value from
forecasts.
Here, users’ subjective estimates of the forecast accuracy are
quantified using a Bayesian model, where the forecast accuracy p
is perceived as ‘‘uncertain” by different users and is, therefore,
modelled by a probability distribution. This prior distribution of
p is updated according to forecast performance, event by event.
The natural (conjugate) prior distribution for the probability of a
binary process is the beta-distribution so that p  Betaða; bÞ with
parameters a; b > 0. The expectation or mean of the distribution
is EðpÞ ¼ l ¼ aaþb and the variance lbðaþbÞðaþbþ1Þ. Thus, by varying a
and b we can express different types of user. As stated previously,
we investigate the behaviour of the following: 1) users who ini-
tially believe the stated accuracy of the forecast, but with differing
levels of scepticism; 2) users who do not initially believe the stated
accuracy of the forecast, and with differing levels of scepticism.
For users of type 1, we assume that l is equal to the specified
forecast accuracy p, i.e. the users believe the forecaster provider’s
assessment of the forecast accuracy is correct on average, but not
exact. Under this assumption, we can think of the distribution in
terms of the mean l and parameter b which controls the variance,
given the mean, since
VarðpÞ ¼ lð1 lÞð1 lÞð1 lþ bÞ : ð5Þ
Then, decreasing the value of b increases the variance of the
distribution, indicating a user who has less confidence in the
assessment of the forecast accuracy.
Modelling forecasts in this way is extremely efficient since the
beta distribution is a conjugate prior, meaning that the posterior
distribution of pjYðtÞ (i.e. after seeing the data) is also a beta distri-
bution with updated parameters of the form
a0 ¼ aþ
Xn
t¼1YðtÞ ! aþ np;
b0 ¼ bþ n
Xn
t¼1YðtÞ ! bþ nð1 pÞ:
ð6Þ
where n represents the total number of forecasts in the series, the
limits are calculated as n tends to infinity and p denotes the long-
run probability of success for the forecast (quoted by the forecast
provider). Thus, as n tends to infinity, the expectation of pjYðtÞ
tends to the long-run probability p,
EðpjYðtÞÞ ¼ a
0
a0 þ b0 !
np
½npþ nð1 pÞ ¼ p: ð7Þ
For users of type 2, we assume l is not equal to the specified
forecast accuracy p, but is instead given by l ¼ 1=2. This indicateseraction can modify the perception of the value of climate information: A
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by the supplier; however, even in this case, users can display dif-
fering levels of scepticism in their response to forecast successes
or failures. For this reason, the specific cases studied here are a uni-
form prior, i.e. a ¼ b ¼ 1; and the Jeffrey’s prior, i.e. a ¼ b ¼ 1=2;
both reflect users that are ignorant about the accuracy of the fore-
cast. The first, is a user who places equal chance that p is some
value between 0 and 1. The latter, reflects a user of similar beliefs,
except they allow more chance that p is close to either zero or one.Fig. 3. Long time series of forecast updates for 100 realisations of both type 1 users
(p = 0.8; b = 5, 1; P(h1) = 1/3).4. Simulation results
For users of type 1, Figs. 2 and 3 plot the updated expectation
for more confident (b = 5, dashed lines) and more sceptical (b = 1,
solid lines) users for a number of different realisations and for dif-
ferent durations. From these figures it is evident that the subjective
estimates of the forecast accuracy vary more for the sceptical user
than the confident user. Both figures also show that the subjective
accuracy exhibits a wide range of values during the first 20–30
forecasts of the assessment, spanning 0.6–0.9. This suggests that
there is a non-zero probability of the forecast being considered to
be of low value, and potentially not used. However, in the long run
with a large number of realisations (see Fig. 3), the expectation
tends asymptotically towards p, with the standard deviation of
the realisations decreasing. Nevertheless, conditional on the values
chosen for b and l, the evidence suggests that it may take 30 or
more repeated forecasts for the subjective assessment of the
forecast accuracy to be consistently close to the known value, p.
When applied to seasonal forecasts, this is likely to be much longer
than most individuals’ occupancy in a particular job role.
To visualise the effect of subjective assessments of forecast per-
formance, event by event, Fig. 4 shows a time series of subjective
value.
For comparison, Figs. 5 and 6 show the subjective accuracy and
value as perceived by users of type 2, who were initially indifferent
to information about forecast accuracy provided by the supplier. As
expected, these users experience large fluctuations in their assess-
ment of forecast accuracy, leading to an initially larger spread than
for the other types of user discussed here. Accordingly, these usersFig. 2. Subjective accuracies after each forecast, for 5 realisations of both type 1
users (p = 0.8; b = 5, 1; P(h1) = 1/3). For comparison, the 1/6th and 5/6th quantiles
for each prior distribution are also shown.
Fig. 4. Time series of subjective ‘forecast value’ updated each forecast for 5
realisations of both type 1 users (U11 = U12 = 5, U21 = 30, U22 = 0; P(h1) = 1/3).
Please cite this article in press as: Pope, E.C.D., et al. Quantifying how user-int
Bayesian approach. clim. Ser. (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cliser.2017.06experience a correspondingly higher likelihood of the subjective
value being zero. However, after approximately 100 repeated fore-
casts there is little to distinguish the users of type 1 and 2 consid-
ered here.
From this, it is clear that sceptical users tend to experience a
greater period of time during which the forecast value is believed
to be no better than that of climatological information. As such,
there is a greater tendency for sceptical users to dismiss the fore-
casts. These findings suggest, that it is incumbent on forecast pro-
viders to demonstrate the accuracy of the climate information
clearly, to ensure that users can be confident in the performance
of the forecast. This could involve more stakeholder engagement,
or providing more detailed evidence for our assessment of forecast
accuracy. As such, the findings are consistent with studies (e.g.
Meinke et al., 2006; van der Voorn et al., 2017) indicating theeraction can modify the perception of the value of climate information: A
.006
Fig. 6. Time series of subjective ‘forecast value’ updated each forecast, for 5
realisations of both type 2 users (U11 = U12 = 5, U21 = 30, U22 = 0; P(h1) = 1/3).
Fig. 5. Long time series of forecast updates for 100 realisations of both type 2 users
(p = 0.8; a = b = 1; a = b = 1/2; P(h1) = 1/3).
6 E.C.D. Pope et al. / Climate Services xxx (2017) xxx–xxximportance of engagement activities which demonstrate the cred-
ibility of the information to a range of users.5. Probabilistic forecasts and uncertainty
As described above, this work has considered user response to
deterministic, binary forecasts. In reality, most forecasts are
probabilistic, which provides additional information about the
likelihood of the event occurring, and may include more than
two forecast categories. User scepticism of a forecast will depend
on its verification attributes across the different categories, and
their interpretation of the results. As such, a forecast that verifies
badly (e.g. lack of resolution, sharpness, or reliability) is likely to
reduce user’s belief in the accuracy of the information. However,
it is important to note that the different verification measuresPlease cite this article in press as: Pope, E.C.D., et al. Quantifying how user-int
Bayesian approach. clim. Ser. (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cliser.2017.06mentioned here may provide useful information for different types
of decision. For example, sharpness may be of most relevance to
users who plan for extremes.
In principle, it seems plausible to hypothesise that a user’s scep-
ticism of a probabilistic forecast will also be a function of the actual
forecast probabilities, interpreted within the context of its verifica-
tion attributes. Given this, a user’s scepticism could change in
response to each forecast. In the framework described above, this
suggests that real users are likely to exhibit a mixture of the beha-
viours outlined above, but with a range of priors and levels of scep-
ticism that vary in accordance with their interpretation of the
available information, based on their own beliefs and innate biases.
6. Summary and conclusions
The expected ‘‘value” of a forecast to a user is dependent on the
costs and losses associated with different outcomes and decisions,
and also the accuracy of the forecast. However, the value, as per-
ceived by a user, may be quite different, depending on their prior
assumptions and interpretation of imperfect forecasts (e.g.
Meinke et al., 2006; Goddard et al., 2010). To better understand
how these factors can influence perceived value, we have proposed
and demonstrated a Bayesian decision theoretic framework for
assessing value to a user, based on the event by event performance
of a synthetic deterministic, binary forecast. This approach was
motivated by engagement with users across the UK transport
sector which took place as part of the FP7 EUPORIAS project. It is
an attempt to conceptualise the impact some factors could have
on the way users respond to climate information, especially those
factors that are under the service provider’s control, e.g. user
engagement.
This approach also builds on current understanding of the value
of ‘‘partial” information which, for any real forecast system, neces-
sarily falls between two limiting cases (e.g. Lindley, 1985):
1) No forecast information, only knowledge of the climatologi-
cal frequency of a particular event
2) Perfect information, in which a forecast is always correct
Calculations (e.g. Fig. 1) show that there is an accuracy thresh-
old below which the forecast offers no additional value above
knowledge of the climatological frequency of event occurrence,
P(h). It is well known that the location of this threshold is user-
dependent; for example, if the penalty for failing to act under
adverse conditions is large compared to the cost of action, there
is a strong incentive for users to always take action. For users
subject to these, or similar constraints, only extremely accurate
forecasts will provide any value above the basic understanding of
the climatology. This suggests that the accuracy threshold above
which the forecast becomes valuable is likely to be higher, for
higher penalties. For large penalties, it is possible that the accuracy
threshold is above 80–90%, making a forecast essentially redun-
dant given plausible limitations on accuracy. However, in many
cases, the threshold is likely to be considerably lower, between
60 and 80%. Under such circumstances, a skilful forecast should
provide appreciable value.
It is important to note that, in the most general case, the penal-
ties are a subjective combination of the true economic costs of the
decision/outcome, as well as the user’s own attitude to risk. For
example, a more risk averse user will tend to assume a higher pen-
alty for forecast misses or false alarms, than a user with prefer-
ences for lower risk aversion. In either case, the methodology
developed here applies, except that the costs and losses for a given
set of outcomes and decisions are themselves also subjective. In
turn, this suggests that a more risk averse user will tend to require
a more accurate forecast to obtain a certain level of value (c.f.eraction can modify the perception of the value of climate information: A
.006
E.C.D. Pope et al. / Climate Services xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 7Blench et al. 1999). Therefore, to assess the subjective nature of
costs and losses, users should be encouraged to consider their indi-
vidual and organisational risk appetite.
As described above, it is clear that users evaluate the perfor-
mance of a forecast according to their own requirements and on
an event-by-event basis. Thus, if the forecast performs badly, it is
likely to be perceived to be of lower value and its use may be
discontinued. According to the approach developed here, users
who are initially more sceptical of the forecast performance are
also more likely to perceive its value to be lower for longer and,
therefore, more likely to stop using it. This scenario is potentially
disadvantageous to these users.
For the cost/loss matrix used in this analysis we have shown
that it can take at least 30 repeated forecasts for the perceived
value to converge to the true value. Applying this reasoning to sea-
sonal forecasts highlights the need to consider all aspects that can
delay the adoption of climate predictions technologies to facilitate
a rapid transition towards a climate resilient society. This suggests
that it is incumbent on forecast providers to clearly demonstrate,
through appropriate engagement activities, the accuracy of the
climate information. In particular, effective communication of the
forecasts and their accuracy, based on robust verification, will
undoubtedly require feedback from users on the specific content
and presentation of the climate information. Furthermore, the
utility of the forecasts for decision-making will depend on a user’s
self-awareness of their attitude to risk, which can also be explored
during engagement activities. Given the results presented here, it
would be of significant interest to compare the behaviour of real
users and these theoretical predictions in future stakeholder
engagement activities.
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